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1974] HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION 1223 
The Federal-Aid ffighway Construction Process: 
Procedures, Cases, and Plaintiff Strategies 
The demand for modem highways has risen sharply. To meet this 
surging need, Congress in 1956 enacted the Federal-Aid Highway Act.l 
In so doing the nation embarked upon a massive twenty-year program 
to construct an interstate highway system linking the major urban areas 
from coast to coast.2 A formidable procedure was established to ad-
225. See Parts ID-IV supra. 
226. An analysis of working capital needs which is too complicated or sophisticated 
might confuse the court and as a result hurt the proponent of such an analysis. See 
Battelstein Inv. Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1971). 
227. See Part V supra. 
1. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374. 
2. The following description of the federal-aid highway program expresses its 
magnitude and effect: 
The pavement area of the system, assembled in one huge parking lot, 
would be 20 miles square and could accommodate two-thirds of all motor ve-
hicles in the United States. New right-of-way needed amounts to 1 Ih million 
acres. Total excavations will move enough material to bury Connecticut knee-
deep in dirt. Sand, gravel, and crushed stone for the construction would build 
a wall 50 feet wide and 9 feet high completely around the world. The concrete 
used would build six sidewalks to the moon; the tar and asphalt would build 
driveways for 35 million homes. The steel will take 30 million tons of iron 
ore, 18 million tons of coal, and 6% million tons of limestone. Lumber and 
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minister the complex scheme by which the federal government reim-
burses the states for highway planning and construction. Although 
this important process was initially closed to effective public participa-
tion, recently issued regulations, new federal statutes, and renewed pub-
lic interest have opened the federal-aid highway program to public 
scrutiny. 
The wisdom of building roads merely because substantial federal 
funding is available has recently come under strong attack. 3 Now that 
the social and environmental effects of large-scale highway building 
are becoming known, more citizens are becoming involved in the plan-
ning process. 4 This comment will discuss: (1) the development of 
federal highway legislation; (2) the procedural requirements of the fed-
eral interstate highway program, including the current case law involv-
ing significant challenges to that process; and (3) the problems and 
potential strategies available to advocate groups in future litigation. 
timber requirements would take all the trees from a 400-square-mile forest. 
Enough culvert and drain pipe is needed to equal the combined water and 
sewer systems in six cities the size of Chicago. 
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RoADS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA'S LIFELINES: FEDERAL 
AID FOR HIGHWAYS 11 (1962), quoted in G. SMERK, URBAN TRANSPOHTATION: THE FED· 
ERAL ROLE 131 (1965). 
3. The prevalent assumption that highways and privately owned automobiles pre-
sent the best system for future transit needs has been severely criticized by planners. 
John E. Hirten, Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, has 
stated, 
What's needed is a "new perception of transportation" which will place 
goals and objectives for mobility in their proper perspective. The need and 
desire for mobility and economic benefits as one value must be weighed against 
the value inherent in social, environmental, ecological, and energy considera-
tions. In order to weigh all these factors in the decisionmaking process, a new 
approach must be taken in planning and developing transportation facilities 
and solutions. 
Hirten, Needed-A New Perception in Transportation, 39 J. AM. !NST. PLAN. 278 
(1973). See also T. STONE, BEYOND THE AUTOMOBILE: RESHAPING THE TRANSPORTA· 
TION ENVIRONMENT (1971). The anti-freeway revolt is well documented in magazine 
and newspaper articles. See Aman, Urban Highways: The Problems of Route Location 
and a Proposed Solution, 47 J. URBAN L. 817, 817 n.l (1970). 
4. A public opinion survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation of 
Princeton, New Jersey revealed several illuminating findings about highways: ( 1) the 
public is poorly informed on the subject of highway financing becaure only one in four 
persons knows that federal-aid highways are mainly funded by the tax on gasoline; (2) 
57% endorse the idea of limiting the use of cars in the downtown areas of cities; (3) 
62% choose the automobile, and 33% select public transit for their most frequent trips; 
(4) 80% characterize their opinion of the U.S. highway system as very favorable or 
fairly favorable; (5) people have a poor idea of how much each driver pays for federal-
aid highways each year; and (6) there is an even division on the question of whether 
highways have a positive or negative effect on the environment. Hearings on S. 3589 
& S. 3590 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-H37, at 682 (1972). 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY-PROGRAM 
The framers of the Constitution recognized the need for a coor-
dinated and efficient transportation system. Their interest was to pre-
serve the free flow of the mails between the states and to normalize 
communications during the post-Revolutionary War period. They em-
powered Congress "to establish Post Offices and post Roads."5 Al-
though overland travelwas difficult, the goal of free interstate .move-
ment was clearly acknowledged. Throughout the Nineteenth Century 
the federal government also aided the transcontinental raih·oads in a 
quest to provide rapid and inexpensive transit for the developing west-
ernlands.6 
The involvement of the federal government in roadbuilding be-
gan in 1916 when Congress established the Bureau of Roads within 
the Department of Agriculture to assist in the construction of rural post 
roads. 7 This legislation set up the reimbursement framework which 
remains intact in the federal-aid highway system today. The federal 
government, through the Department of Agriculture, would refund 
state expenditures for the planning and construction of approved high-
ways as long as the completed roadway met established federal stan~:­
ards.8 Under the 1916 legislation, state highway departments sub-
mitted projects of "substantial character" for federal approval, after 
which up to fifty percent of the project cost could be returned to the 
state. 9 The states were under an obligation to maintain the federal-aid 
highways10 and to refrain from charging tolls for their use. 11 An 
amendment in 1921 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to give prefer-
ential treatment to interstate highways.12 This directive foreshadowed 
the ultimate federal emphasis on the interstate system. 
By 1944 the program had been considerably expand4~d. Con-
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. . 
6. See generally C. GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS 
AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890, at 268-71 (1960); R. HUNT, LAW AND LocOMOTIVES 87-88 
(19~8); G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, at 15 (1965). 
7. Act of July 11, 1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355. 
8. ld. at 357. 
9. ld. Congress initially appropriated five million dollars for the program in 
1916. ld. at 356. In addition, the allowable reimbursement was limited to ten thousand 
dollars per mile. ld. at 358. This stands in stark contrast to modem roadbuilding costs. 
10. ld. at 358. 
11. ld. at 356. This provision has been continued and is codified in 23 U.S.C. 
§ 301 (1970). 
12. "That in approving projects to receive Federal aid under the provisions of this 
Act the Secretary of Agriculture shall give preference to such projects as will expedite 
the completion of an adequate and connected system of highways, interstate in charac-
ter." Act of Nov. 9, 1921, ch. 119, § 6, 42 Stat. 212. - · ·· 
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gress appropriated one and one-half billion dollars for highway con-
struction during a three-year post-war period.13 Emphasis was turned 
to the creation of a forty thousand mile highway system linking the 
major urban areas in the nation.14 In 1956 Congress passed new fed-
eral highway aid legislation which was intended to implement the 1916 
act and all subsequent amendments.10 This bill committed substan-
tial federal funds to the nation's highways and increased the federal 
reimbursement to ninety percent.16 Again the completion of the in-
terstate highway system became the goal of the program, but this time 
it was to be financed through the Highway Trust Fund.17 
The final administrative change in the federal roadbuilding effort 
occurred in 1966 when the Department of Transportation was formed.18 
This newly created agency was established to coordinate the develop-
ment of all types or transportation, 19 and the Federal Highway Adminis-
trator was brought within its organizational structure.20 
IT. PROCEDURE 
The federal interstate highway system presents the observer 
with a peculiar picture of administrative cooperation. The highways 
are planned, engineered, constructed, and maintained by the states but 
financed primarily by the federal government. An elaborate procedure 
has grown up around the system by which the individual state highway 
agencies obtain reimbursement for highway building activities. This 
process entails communication in two directions: application from the 
states to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and response 
from the federal agency back to the states. The actors in this system 
13. Act of Dec. 20, 1944, ch. 626, 58 Stat. 838. 
14. ld. at 842. This figure has been increased to 42,500 miles, 23 U.S.C. 
§ 103(e)(3) (1970). In addition, the time estimate for the completion of the interstate 
system was originally set at sixteen years (1956-1972). Now most observers project 
completion sometime after 1980. 
15. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374. 
16. 23 U.S.C. § 120(c) (1970). 
17. Id. § 101(b) states that "it is hereby declared that the prompt and early com-
pletion of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways . • • is essential to 
the national interest and is one of the most important objectives of this Act." Section 
105(c) of that title further provides for preference to be given to projects of an inter-
state character. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, tit II, § 209, 70 Stat. 397, created the 
Highway Trust Fund to be sustained by taxes on road userS. The best known of these 
taxes is the four cents per gallon tax on gasoline sales. Other sources of revenue are 
taxes on rubber tubes and tires, heavy vehicles, automobiles parts and accessories, and 
a manufacturers tax on trucks, buses, and trailers. 
18. Act of Oct 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931. 
19. Id. at 933. 
20. Id. at 932. 
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are easily identifiable. The states are represented by officials in their 
respective highway departments. The federal government, on the other 
hand, delegates administrative power through an extensive pyramid of 
agents. Atop this structure is the Secretary of the Department of Trans-
portation who vests the Federal Highway Administrator with the power 
to oversee the federal-aid program. Subordinate to the Federal High-
way Administrator are twelve regional officers who seek to insure uni-
form practices by the state highway departments. Finally, there is one 
division office located in each state, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico. 21 The function of supervising state action and enforcing 
compliance with federal statutes, regulations, and memoranda is exer-
cised by the division offices. The division engineer is the principal 
FHW A representative in each state, and consequently most routine de-
cisionmaking is done by him. 22 There is a further subdivision of fed-
eral presence into districts and their component areas. The similarity 
of professional outlook and the close working relationship between the 
division engineer and state highway department officials has prompted 
criticism from those who opposed unbridled highway construction. It 
is argued that important decisions bearing on environmental and social 
considerations have been made by isolated administrators working 
with preconceived notions of what is best for the ,public.23 Further-
more, when these decisions are litigated, there is often much confusion 
about the exact requirements of federal law. Judges have been far 
from uniform in their interpretation of the federal statutes and regula-
tions which prescribe the procedural and substantive requirements of 
the federal-aid highway construction process.24 Judicial misinterpre-
tation of the statutory mandates is often caused by unknowledgeable 
counsel who fail adequately to understand and brief the more general 
21. 26 Fed. Reg. 12536-39 (1961). 
22. FHWA Administrative Memorandum 1-10.2 (Aug. 21, 1969). Federal High-
way Administrator Francis C. Turner stated that of the 5,515 Federal-aid highway proj-
ect approvals made in the first half of 1970, only 154 required Washington office action. 
Ninety-seven percent of the decisions are made in division offices. Red Tape-Inquiring 
into Delays and Excessive Papenvork in Administration of Public Works Programs Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public 
Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Red Tape]. 
23. Besides the lack of restraints on the discretion of highway officials, institu-
tional self-interest threatens a balanced transportation policy. Tabor R. Stone writes, 
"This resistance [to alternative transportation modes] is reinforced by that of various 
state highway departments, whose personnel see their livelihood threatened by any sys-
tematic movement that would discourage the continuous production and maintenance of 
an extensive highway network." T. STONE, supra note 3, at 122. 
24. Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid Highway Program: Administrative Pro-
cedures and Judicial Interpretation, 2 ENV. L. REP. 50001, 50017-18 (1972). 
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procedural framework for their cases. Fortunately, there has been a 
substantial amount of highway construction litigation in recent years 
which has clarified the legal duties of both state and federal officials 
under federal highway statutes and regulations. 
The following narrative describes the procedure by which states 
are partially reimbursed for planning and constructing roads that are 
part of the interstate highway system. To simplify matters, the federal-
aid highway program can be viewed in five progressive stages: (1) 
program approval; (2) route location approval; (3) design approval; 
( 4) plans, specification and estimate approval; and (5) construction 
approval. Each step in this process is preceded by various state and 
federal actions which are required by federal statute, administrative 
. regulation, and FHWA memoranda.25 Federal repayment for com-
pleted work accrues only when the specified prerequisites are met. 
A. Program Approval 
When Congress authorizes funds for federal-aid highway projects, 
the Federal Highway Administrator must apportion these monies to the 
states according to a predetermined formula. 26 After a state's share 
has been determined, it is further divided for use in each category of 
the federal-aid highway program in that state. 27 The state itself de-
cides which particular projects will be proposed for reimbursement. 
From its own studies measuring present road capacity and future high-
way demand, the state highway department will establish developmen-
tal priorities for road systems. A program of proposed projects is 
then drawn up which lists every project for which funding will be re-
quested. This program must be submitted to the FHW A for an ap-
proval which serves as a condition precedent to future reimbursement. 28 
25. Many federal requirements appear as directives, memoranda, or regulations. 
Properly promulgated regulations undoubtedly carry with them the force of law. Direc-
tives and memoranda present problems for litigators. Id. at 50001-02 n.7. The author-
ity to make policies and procedures is delegated to the Federal Highway Administrator, 
but 23 C.P.R. § 1.32(a) (1973) specifically declares that such action does not carry 
with it the legal effect of a regulation. The Comptroller General, on the other hand, 
has ruled that these policies and procedures do have legal status, 43 CoMP. GEN. 31 
(1964). The precise legal authority of the various memoranda issued by the Federal 
Highway Administrator remains unsettled. 
26. 23 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). The discussion of this process in Peterson & Kennan, 
supra note 24, at 50003-06, is especially illuminating. 
27. This means that the state highway department will know the amount it has 
to spend on its federally supported primary, secondary, and interstate systems. 
· 28. 23 U.S.C. § 103(f) (1970); FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-
1, para. 2(a) (April15, 1958). 
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Prior to this administrative action, several prerequisites must be ful-
filled. 
First, in urban areas with a population of more than fifty thou-
sand, each project must be shown to be part of a "continuing compre-
hensive transportation planning process."29 This requirement, added 
in 1962, seeks to encourage the application of long range planning 
principles to transportation programs. In D.C. Federation of Civic 
Associations v. Volpe30 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that the Secretary, in making this determination, must not rely 
solely on a single, existing plan but must consider the continuous com-
prehensive planning process for the area in question. 31 
Second, the state has the duty to coordinate its highway planning 
activities with its designated A-95 review clearinghouse to assure that 
notice of each project will be circulated to all interested agencies. 32 
Third, it must be determined whether the proposed projects entail 
work on highways located on the federal-aid system. 33 If a road is not 
presently situated on 1the federal-aid system, application must be made 
to the FHW A to establish that designation. 34 The question of what 
constitutes a federal-aid highway is frequently litigated. .Although a 
road is approved as part of the state's program and located on the 
federal-aid system, it may fail to become a federal-aid project governed 
by federal law. Highways constructed entirely with state funds and 
under the exclusive supervision of state officials are clearly exempt from 
most of the federal highway construction regulations. 35 However, par-
tial federal funding of a highway construction project subjects it to all 
of the legal requirements of a federal-aid highway. The major ques-
tion before the courts is when in the highway building process are 
federal requirements applicable. In La Raza Unida v. Volpe36 the 
court stated that a highway project becomes part of the federal-aid high-
29. 23 u.s.c. § 134 (1970). 
30. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972). 
31. Id. at 1239-40. 
32. Office of Budget and Management, Circular A-95, reprinted in HousiNG & 
DEV. REP. 110:0701 (1974). 
33. The federal statute prohibits program approval of any project not on the fed-
eral-aid system. 23 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970) specifically states that "the Secretary may 
approve a program in whole or in part; but he shall not approve any project in a pro-
posed program which is not located upon an approved Federal-aid system." 
34. 23 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1973). See also FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 
10-1 (May 28, 1965). 
35. Civic Improvement Comm'n v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1972) (per 
curiam). 
36. 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971). 
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way system upon location approval and that the various statutes and 
regulations apply after that time even though a state subsequently 
does not request actual federal funding.37 The Fifth Circuit in Named 
Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas 
Highway Department38 took a similar approach. It stated that a high-
way became a federal project when the Secretary of Transportation 
authorized federal participation. The court concluded that the high-
way would remain subject to federal standards even if the state under-
took the entire funding of the project.39 Thus some courts have found 
the applicability of federal highway requirements to depend not upon 
federal funding but upon state action which initiates the federal-aid 
highway process. · 
Fourth, the state highway department must provide assurances to 
the FHW A that "employment in connection with proposed projects will 
be provided without regard to race, color, creed or national origin."40 
This requirement is easy to satisfy on paper but difficult to police in 
the field. 
Fifth, highway projects which propose to use public parklands 
or historic sites must be justified on two grounds. It is necessary to 
show that there exists "no feasible and prudent alternative" to the use 
of the land and that the project will be planned to minimize the harm 
resulting from the useY This requirement establishes, as a national 
policy, the preservation of these lands. 
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe42 the Supreme 
Court concluded that if an interstate highway were to be built through 
Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee, the Secretary must first deter-
mine ithat, as a matter of sound engineering, it would not be feasible to 
37. Id. at 227. 
38. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971). 
39. Id. at 1027. 
40. 23 U.S.C. § 140(a) (1970). Furthermore, if it is considered necessary, the 
Secretary of the Department of Transportation may 
I d. 
require certification by any State desiring to avail itself of the benefits of this 
chapter that there are in existence and available on a regional, statewide, or 
local basis, apprenticeship, skill improvement or other upgrading programs, reg· 
istered with the Department of Labor or the appropriate State agency, if any, 
which provide equal opportunity without regard to race, color, creed or na· 
tional origin. 
41. Id. § 138. This section was added in 1968 to make the wording in title 23 
identical to that of section 1653(f) in title 49. Title 49 governs all programs and proj-
ects subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transporation. 
42. 401 u.s. 402 (1971). 
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build the highway along any other route. 43 In order to escape the 
prohibitions of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 
the Secretary must also decide that the cost of community disruption 
resulting from the use of alternative routes must be extraordinarily 
great or that highly unusual factors exist which demand the use of the 
parklands for the projectY The Court stressed that the protection of 
parklands was of paramount importance. Consequently, the decision 
left the Secretary no room for a wide-ranging balancing of interests. 45 
This decision subjected the Secretary's decision to judicial review. The 
reviewing court must find that the Secretary's determination was not 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law."46 In essence, the court must evaluate the de-
cision to determine whether there was a clear error of judgment in its 
formulation. 47 
Other cases have expanded the Overton Park decision. In Arling-
ton Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe48 the Fourth Circuit held that 
in determining what parkland is "significant," and thus within the 
coverage of the statute, only the value of the land as a park may be 
considered. Its worth as a highway is not relevant in this evaluation. 49 
A finding by local officials that a small municipal park was more im-
portant as a potential highway than as a park did not deprive the park 
of its "local significance" and thus its protection under the statute. 50 
The definition of what constitutes a "use" of parkland under the 
statute has also been broadly interpreted by the courts. A park was 
deemed to be used when a highway was planned to encircle it although 
none of its land was actually taken. 51 Similarly, parkland was con-
43. Id. at 411. 
44. I d. at 413. 
45. Id. at 411. 
46. Id. at 416. 
47. The Court's authority and jurisdiction to make this determination are derived 
from the Administrative Procedure Act, S U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). The Court decided 
in Overton Park that section 706(2) (A) provided the appropriate standard against 
which to evaluate the Secretary's decision. 401 U.S. at 416. Section 706(2) (A) pro-
vides: "The reviewing court shall ..• bold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law . • . ." Although the Court found no requirement 
that written findings of fact accompany the Secretary's decision, Department of Trans-
portation Order 5610.1 now requires such findings whenever the Secretary approves the 
use of parklands for a highway. 401 U.S. at 417. 
48. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972). 
49. Id. at 1336. 
SO. Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas High-
way Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1026-27 (Sth Cir. 1971). 
Sl. Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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sidered to be used when a highway was designed to follow a border of 
the park. 5 2 
The Secretary must make his determination under section 4(f) 
before program approval is granted. A Department of Transportation 
Order requires the Secretary to submit written findings along with his 
decision. 53 
Finally, the selection of projects to be included in a state's pro-
gram must be made "by the appropriate local officials and the State 
highway department in cooperation with each other.""4 The federal-
aid highway statute makes these factors prerequisites for program ap-
proval. At this stage in the aid process the public has no direct access 
to the federal or state agencies which will make important and some-
times irrevocable decisions. :;r. 
B. Route Location Approval 
After federal approval of the list of projects in the state's pro-
gram has been obtained, the state must then seek route location ap-
proval. 56 The program approval authorizes preliminary engineering 
and the right-of-way acquisition estimates necessary for alternative lo-
cation studies which are to follow. The state highway department then 
explores the various possible locations to determine which presents 
the most feasible route. In order to comply with federal requirements, 
the state must prepare estimates illustrating the number of individuals, 
families, and firms that would be ' displaced by each suggested place-
ment of the highway and the availability of adequate replacement hous-
ing for each alternative. 57 This information and all supporting data 
must be available at the subsequent location public hearing. The Uni-
form Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act 
52. Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 639 (D. Vt. 
1973). 
53. See note 47 supra. 
54. 23 u.s.c. § 105(d) (1970). 
55. A FHWA regulation, 23 C.F.R. § 795 (1973), has been promulgated recently 
which directs state highway departments to develop action plans "[t]o assure that adequate 
consideration is given to possible social, economic, and environmental effects of pro· 
posed highway projects • • •• " Id. These action plans, which must be approved 
by the governor of the state and the FHW A regional administrator, are designed to pro· 
vide specialized impact information during the early stages of highway development. 
This information must be made available to the public. The action plan requirement 
will be reviewed intermittently. Non-compliance with the action plan may subject the 
state highway department to punitive sanctions. 
56. See 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970); 23 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1973). 
57. FHWA Instructional Memorandum 80-1, para. 14(b) (Dec. 10, 1970). Relo· 
cation activities at this stage of the project are described as conceptual stage activities. 
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of 1970 {URA)58 requires that a state participating in the federal-aid 
highway program give "satisfactory assurances" that: 
(1) . . . "fair and reasonable relocation" payments for moving ex-
penses and for "replacement housing" will be provided to per-
sons who must relocate; 
(2) . . . "relocation assistance programs" will be provided for 
such displaced persons; and · 
(3) . . . "within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement 
there will be available" adequate replacement housing. 59 
In La Rasa Unida v. Volpe and Lathan v. Volpe, the courts held that 
compliance with this segment of the federal relocation statute must oc-
cur no later than location approval. 60 
Next, the state highway department must evaluate the potential 
environmental impact of the proposed highway project and disseminate 
its findings in the form of a draft impact statement. 61 This report must 
include the specific items listed in the FHW A policy memoranda. 62 
58. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4601-55 (1970). 
59. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1972); see 42 U.S.C. § 
4630 (1970). This practice is called giving statewide assurances. FHWA Instructional 
Memorandum 80-1, paras. 7(a)(1)-(3) (Dec. 10, 1970). 
60. Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v. 
Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The Ninth Circuit held in Lathan 
that the congressional purposes' behind the URA required that detailed relocation assur-
ances be prepared not later than the location stage. 455 F.2d at 1119. 
61. See FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 5(a) (Aug. 24, 
1971). In paragraph 3(c) of that memorandum the environmental impact statement 
is defined as 
a written statement containing an assessment of the anticipated si&'llificant 
beneficial or detrimental effects which the agency decision may have upon the 
quality of the human environment for the purposes of: (1) assuring that care-
ful attention is given to environmental matters, (2) providing a vehicle for im-
plementing all applicable environmental requirements, and (3) to insure that 
the environmental impact is taken into account in the agency decision. 
The term "human environment" is broadly defined in paragraph 3(f) as, ~'the aggregate 
of all external conditions and influences (aesthetic, ecological, biological, cultural, social, 
economic, historical, etc.) that affect the life of a human." This memorandum has been 
issued by the FHWA to guide the states and division engineers in the proper execution 
of national environmental policy. It draws its authority from four sources; (1) the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970); (2) the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act§ 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970); (3) the Historic Pres-
ervation Act of 1966 § 106, 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1970); and (4) the Clean Air Act 
of 1970 § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)(7) (1970). Seventeen copies of the draft impact 
statement must be sent to the FHWA division engineer in the state for distribution. 
FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(d) (Aug. 24, 1971). 
62. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, app. E (Aug. 24, 1971). 
This memorandum provides also for the exemption of "urgently needed" highway sec-
tions from the requirement of preparing the environmental impact statement. A request 
for exemption by the state highway department must be approved by the FHW A, the 
Office of the Secretary of Transportation, and the Council on Environmental Quality. 
Id. para. 5(g). 
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The FHW A has established rules to determine whether a particular 
highway section must receive environmental scrutiny. 63 Where a high-
way would (1) cause actual or anticipated opposition to its construc-
tion, or (2) significantly affect historic or conservation land, regardless 
of public ownership, or (3) be classified as a major action likely to 
significantly affect the quality of the human envirorunent, dra£t and 
final environmental statements are required. 64 
Much federal-aid highway litigation at the location stage focuses 
on the impact statement requirement. Section 102(2)(c) of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 19696G "authorizes and directs that, 
to the fullest extent possible," every agency of the federal government 
shall: 
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on-
{i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should 
it be implemented. oo 
63. Id. app. F. This memorandum uses the term "highway section" and not "proj-
ect" to describe the length of highway subject to an environmental review. Paragraph 
6 of this Memorandum states: 
The highway section included in an environmental statement should be 
as long as practicable to permit consideration of environmental matters on a 
broad scope. Peacemealing [sic] proposed highway improvements in separate 
environmental statements should be avoided. If possible, the highway section 
should be of substantial length that would normally be included in a multi· 
year highway improvement program. 
64. Id. app. F(l). In paragraph four of this appendix the description of the "nega-
tive declaration" is given. No impact statement must be submitted for highway sections 
in this classification. A section not considered to be a major action and/or not signifi· 
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment is to receive a negative declara-
tion. Whereas a draft environmental impact statement must undergo substantial federal 
and state scrutiny, the negative declaration is exempted from this analysis. It need only 
be available for public inspection at the location hearing. Id. para. 6(n). Based on 
new information, a highway department or the FHW A may rescind the negative decla-
ration and have an impact statement prepared. Id. para. 6(o). But the ultimate deci-
sion on the adequacy of the negative declaration lies in the hands of the FHWA division 
engineer. Id. para. 6(n). This stands in stark contrast to the high level review every 
draft environmental impact statement must undergo. Id. para. 6(d). 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). 
66. Id. 
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The importance of this statutory mandate has been emphasized 
many times by the courts. In a leading NEP A case, Calvert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,67 the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "NEP A, first 
of all, makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of every 
federal agency and department."68 Furthermore the court :noted that 
"[T]he Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible; [t]hey must be 
complied with to the fullest extent, unless there is a clear conflict of 
statutory authority."69 Although Calvert Cliffs' concerned an ABC 
project and not a federal-aid highway, the Calvert Cliffs' ~malysis of 
NEP A has been widely applied by courts in highway litigation. 70 
In almost all cases, federal-aid highway construction projects con-
stitute "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment" within the meaning and coverage of NEPA. 71 In 
Scherr v. Volpe72 the Seventh Circuit examined FHWA Policy and Pro-
cedure Memorandum 90-173 to help it determine the relevant criteria for 
finding major federal action in the construction of highways. It con-
cluded that a major federal action included even the upgrading of an 
existing highway when such construction significantly affected the en-
vironment. 74 Moreover, the decision of administrative officials that a 
particular project was not a major federal action was held subject to 
broad judicial review. 75 
The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) required by NEPA 
must be objective, inclusive, and based on e~tensive ;research. Brooks 
v. Volpe76 condemned a highway project EIS that was based on gen-
eralities and "heavy-handed self-justifications."77 The EIS must have 
a sufficient research base and must be comprehensive enough to pro-
vide a useful record for judicial review. 78 Potential air and noise pol-
67. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
68. Id. at 1112. 
69. Id. at 1115; see Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 
749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
70. Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 
1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1972); Named Individual Mem-
bers of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1{)13, 1024-
25 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 
269, 277-79 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). 
72. 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). 
73. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memor~dum 90-1 (Aug. 24, 1971). 
74. 466 F.2d at 1032-33. 
75. Id. at 1032. 
76. 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
77. Id. at 278. 
78. Id. at 277. 
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lution from a new highway should also be considered in the EIS.70 
Two of the most contested aspects of the NEPA section 102(2)(c) 
requirements concern (1) the extent of federal participation necessary 
in the initial drafting of the EIS and (2) the determination of whether 
individual impact statements can cover relatively small segments of 
highway, thus avoiding regional environmental considerations. 
As to the participation question, courts have generally required 
federal agencies to take an active role in the EIS process in projects 
under their supervision. 80 In Conservation Society v. Secretary of 
Transportation81 the court held that the Federal Highway Authority 
(FHW A) had abdicated its responsibility under NEPA by substituting 
the EIS of the Vermont Highway Department for its own. 82 The court 
stated that both NEPA and Memorandum 90-1 were violated by 
FHW A reliance on the state EIS, and it concluded that an EIS drawn 
by a state highway department will certainly be self-serving.83 The 
FHW A could not adequately perform its decisionmaking role under 
NEP A without actually participating in the researching and drafting 
of the EIS. State participation in EIS drafting will be allowed as long 
as there is no state dominance of the procedure. 
Other cases have implied that less federal participation is re-
quired.84 In Fair v. Volpe85 the court found FHWA participation in a 
research study, presumably preliminary to the actual drafting of the 
EIS, sufficient to satisfy the NEP A requirements. In fact, for the vast 
79. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1334 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
80. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 
420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). The FPC regulations requiring ap-
plicants seeking power plant licenses to prepare environmental impact statements were 
invalidated as improper delegations of agency power. The court accused the FPC of 
abandoning its responsibilities under NEP A and required the FPC staff to draw up the 
final impact statement without outside assistance. I d. at 420, 422. 
81. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973). 
82. Id. at 632. 
83. Id. at 631. At least one court has gone farther than the Conservation Society 
decision. In Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972), 
the court viewed FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1 as an improper dele-
gation of responsibilites mandated by NEP A and consequently struck down the memo-
randum. The court reasoned that a department could not provide an impartial analysis 
of a project's impact. Contra, Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 
286 (D. Kan. 1973); National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 
(D. Mont. 1972). These two decisions uphold the memorandum as a reasonable dele-
gation of power. 
84. See National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 
1972); Iowa Citizens For Environmental Quality v. Volpe, 4 Env. Rep. Cases 1755 
(S.D. rowa 1972). 
85. 5 Env. Rep. Cases 1205, 1207-08 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
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majority of highway projects, state highway departments alone have 
drafted the impact statements. 
The piecemealing question goes to the heart of the NEP A man-
date. The ability of the NEPA section 102(2)(c) statement to pro-
vide a meaningful environmental impact analysis of a chosen highway 
section and its alternatives is significantly impaired when highway of-
ficials are permitted to draft individual impact statements for many 
small segments of a large highway project. 86 Critical examinations of 
the environmental effect of the placement of a roadway must occur on 
a larger geographic scale to give full meaning to the spirit and purpose 
ofNEPA. 
In a recent case, Conservation Society v. Secretary of Transporta-
tion, 87 the United States District Court for the District of Vermont 
reached the above conclusion. Th~ court required the FHW A to 
draft and consider an EIS for Jthe entire I-7 corridor, transversing three 
states, before construction could begin on the contested Bennington to 
Manchester segment of the road. 88 Defendants had only prepared 
statements on an individual basis for those segments of I-7 to be con-
structed in the near future. The obvious problem with this approaoh 
is that approval of subsequently constructed highway segments often 
becomes obligatory when the EIS for those projects is drafted and con-
sidered. Meaningful evaluation of environmental consequences be-
comes moot since the failure to build the proposed segment would ren-
der the previously constructed roadway inefficient or useless. 89 The 
more segments of the highway completed, the more this becomes ap-
parent.00 
The Conservation Society decision is virtually unique in this area. 
Most NEP A cases have not discussed the piecemealing question, and it 
can be surmised that few courts in the past would have adopted the 
Conservation Society rationale had the question arisen. -
86. See generally Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y 
v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1022-24 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 933 (1972); Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-09 (N.D. Cal. 1972); 
Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (S.D. Iowa 1972). 
87. 362F:Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973). 
88. Id. at 638. 
89. Id. at 637. 
90. The piecemealing problem exists as to other statutory requirements of the fed-
eral-aid highway procedure. For example, similar arguments can be made as to the 
scope of the public bearings required under 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970) and FHWA 
Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8 (Jan. 14, 1969). As with impact statements, 
the practice bas been to hold public bearings for relatively short segments of proposed 
highways rather than for the entire highway as a· complete entity. -
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In Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 91 another recent case, 
the court held that NEP A did not require the preparation of an EIS for 
the entire network of constructed and proposed federal-aid highways 
in the Baltimore area. 92 This holding was based upon the finding that 
the area-wide road network involved several distinct highways and that 
Department of Transportation decisions had been made for individual 
highway projects rather than for the entire system. ~3 The court stated, 
however, that impact statements prepared for those individual projects 
should reflect the projects' environmental impact in relation to the' en-
tire configuration. 94 
The Movement Against Destruction case does not go as far as 
Conservation Society and does not determine what proportion of a sin-
gle highway corridor must be considered in any one environmental im-
pact statement. The effectiveness of NEP A :in the highway construc-
tion area will be determined in part by the position that the courts will 
adopt on the piecemealing question in future cases. oG However, an 
important portion of FHW A Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1 
directs that environmental impact statements must be prepared for 
"highway sections" and not for "projects."96 This administrative rul-
ing would seemingly bar segmented environmental analysis of high-
ways and guide judicial evaluation of future piecemealing efforts. 
The draft impact statement, as written in the location approval 
stage, is then widely distributed to federal, state, and local agencies 
for review and comment. Finally the draft impact statement is made 
available for public inspection. 97 But public comment is sought only 
after the decision to build a highway has been made and after federal 
and state agency review has occurred. Citizens cannot participate in 
the determination of whether a highway or another mode of transpor-
tation is best suited to the needs of the area. Furthermore, the review-
ing agencies pass on the impact of the project without first obtaining 
91. 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md. 1973). 
92. ld. at 1402. 
93. ld. at 1381. 
94. ld. at 1385. 
95. For a discussion of the question of substantive review of highways under 
NEPA see authorities cited in note 176 and accompanying text infra. 
96. See note 63 supra. 
97. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(c) (Aug. 24, 1971) 
requires that the draft environmental impact statement be made available to the public 
no later than the first required notice of the location public hearing (30 to 40 days, 
see FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8, paras. 7-8 (Jan. 14, 1969) ), or no-
tic~ of the oplJortunity to request a public hearing. 
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public comments. In this way the public is excluded from the highway 
planning process. 
At the location stage the state must also contact any railroad or 
utility in the path of a proposed highway site to discuss future reloca-
tion of facilities. Federal reimbursement funds are available for ninety 
percent of this cost. 98 
Federal statutes now require that a location or corridor public 
hearing be held09 and FHW A has issued detailed regulations directing 
the conduct of both the corridor and design public hearings.100 State 
highway departments may satisfy this requirement either by holding a 
hearing or by publicizing the opportunity to request one. Nearly all 
federal highway construction projects necessitate operation of this sec-
tion of the federal transportation law. Strict notice requirements are 
imposed upon the highway departments to insure public awareness of 
the project.101 At the location hearing, the relocation assistance pro-
gram must be discussed;102 information about alternative highway lo-
cations must be made available;103 the draft must be explained;104 and 
responsible state highway officials must be present to conduct the 
98. 23 u.s.c. § 123 (1970). 
99. Id. § 128. See also Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 
693, 701 (2d Cir. 1972); D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1242 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
100. 23 C.P.R. §§ 790.3(a)-(b) (1973). Subsection (a) defines the corridor public 
hearing as a hearing that, 
( 1) Is held before the route location is approved and before the State highway 
department is committed to a specific proposal, except as provided in § 
790.5(g). 
(2) Is held to ensure that an opportunity is afforded for effective participation 
by interested persons in the process of determining the need for, and the loca-
tion of, a Federal-aid highway; and 
(3) Provides a public forum that affords a full opportunity for presenting 
views on each of the proposed alternative highway locations and the social, 
economic, and environmental effects of those alternative locations. 
101. Id. § 790.7(a). Subsection (a)(2) further requires that notice c-f the hearing 
be mailed to "appropriate news media, the State's resource, recreation, and planning 
agencies, and appropriate representatives of the Departments of Interior and Housing 
and Urban Development" Copies are also to be sent "to other Federal agencies, and 
local public officials, public advisory groups and agencies who have requested notice of 
hearing and other groups or agencies who, by nature of their function, interest, or re-
sponsibility the highway department knows or believes might be interested in or affected 
by the proposal." This subsection also directs the highway department to create a list 
of such interested parties to which notice could be sent automatically. Expenses in-
curred by the public hearing may be reimbursed by the federal government. Id. § 
790.11. 
102. Id. § 790.7(b)(7). See also Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1340 (C.D. 
Cal. 1972). 
103. 23 C.P.R.§ 790.7(b)(3) (1973). 
104. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(e) (Aug. 24, 1971). 
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meeting and answer questions. 105 Citizen participation and response 
must be reflected in the study reports submitted by the state to the 
FHW A. In this way local viewpoints are brought to the attention of 
federal decisionmakers.106 Additionally, in Keith v. V olpe,1°7 the court 
held that the potential air and noise pollution impact of the proposed 
highway must be considered at the location hearing. The court in 
Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe108 ruled that in certain 
cases proposed area-wide rapid transit systems should be discussed at 
the corridor hearing and that the projected highway construction be 
evaluated in light of mass transit possibilities.100 These decisions re~ 
fleet the fact that judges are demanding that public hearings consider a 
wide range of subjects in order to present a realistic picture of available 
alternatives. 
Theoretically, public comment and any agency reaction received 
must be incorporated into a revision of the location selection and en~ 
vironmental analysis. After making its route selection, the state must 
formally Tequest location approval, cer.ti:fy :that public location hear~ 
ings have been held, deliver public hearing transcripts and certificates 
3lld submit a thorough study r-eport concerning .the highway section.110 
A recent FHW A regulation ·has ·added the requirement that a detailed 
survey of the noise impact of ·the various proposed route Jocations be 
included in the location study repo!1t111 and federal-aid highways must 
now conform to standards which limit noise levels.112 These docu~ 
ments must accompany the state's request for location approval that 
105. 23 C.P.R.§ 790.7(b)(4) (1973). 
106. Id. § 790.8(b)(2)(ii). Federal Highway Administrator F.C. Turner has ad· 
mitted that in 15% of all projects, a major change resulted from the public hearing; 
Red Tape 86. 
107. 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1339 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
108. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972). 
10.9. Id. at 1337. 
110. 23 C.P.R. §§ 790.9(e)(1)(i)-(iv) (1973). Subsection (b) provides a detailed 
framework for the preparation of the study report. See also note 63 supra. 
111. 23 C.P.R. § 772.7(b)(3) (1973). The purpose of the newly promulgated reg-
ulation is: 
To provide noise standards and procedures for use by State highway agen· 
cies and the Federal Highway Administrator (FHWA) in the planning and 
design of highways approved pursuant to title 23, United States Code, and to 
assure that measures are taken in the overall public interest to achieve highway 
noise levels that are compatible with different land uses, with due consideration 
also given to other social, economic and environmental effects. 
Id. § 772.1. 
112. ld. § 772.6(a). Section 772.3(b) adds that a state may be exempted from 
complying with the noise standards for a particular project if it can show that any one 
of three broadly defined conditions exists. It is recommended in section 772.7(b)(8) 
that any requests for exceptions should be identified and included in the location study 
report. Exceptions apparently are available only through the design approval stage. 
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is transmitted to the local division engineer. Public notices must be 
given of the selection.113 Next, the final EIS, embodying any modifi-
cation incurred during the period of review and comment, must be for-
warded to the Regional Federal Highway Administrator for high level 
approval.114 Location approval may not be granted by the division 
engineer until the regional official accepts the final impact statement 
and .the Office of Environment ·and Urban Systems of :the Department 
of Transportation concurs with that action.115 In addition, the public 
and the Council on Environmental QuaHty must be given rthirty days 
to inspect the final impact statement.116 When all of these prereq-
uisites have been fulfilled, the division engineer acts upon the state's 
application. If the selected location is acceptable to the division en-
gineer, the state highway department will then seek design approval 
for the roadway. 
C. Design Approval 
Upon granting location approval, the federal division engineer 
authorizes the commencement of design engineering for the project 
and the appraisal of right-of-way property. In some instances, full or 
partial right-of-way condemnation may be permitted prior to the de-
sign public hearing.117 A period of design study must follow in which 
the specifio location and the major design features are determined. 
Concurrently, a final relocation plan for displaced residents is pre-
pared. 
As with location approval, design selection requires that an oppor-
tunity for a public hearing be given to insure citizen participation in 
the decisionmaking process.118 The public is provided adequate no-
tice of the hearing, and subsequently the hearings are conducted under 
established guidelines.119 The purpose of this hearing is to expose the 
113. ld. § 790.10. 
114. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, para. 6(j) (Aug. 24, 1971). 
Actually the regional office then sends the final EIS to the FHW A's Office of Environ-
mental Policy. This national office transmits the document to the Office of Environ-
ment and Urban Systems of the Department of Transportation for further concurrence 
and then finally to the Council on Environmental Quality for recording. Id. para. 6(k). 
115. Id. para. 6(k). 
116. Id. para. 6(k)(2)(b). . 
117. The general rule concerning right-of-way acquisition is that it cannot take 
place until after the design public hearing. 23 C.F.R. § 790.9(f) (1973) provides for 
taking prior to the hearing in the unusual circumstances set forth in section 790.2( c). 
118. ld. §§ 790.3(b)(1)-(3). 
119. ld. § 790.7. Subsection (a)(4) requires that the notice announcing the design 
hearing must indicate "that tentative schedules for right-of-way acquisition and construc-
tion will be discussed [at the meeting]." 
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specific highway location and design features to public scrutiny. 120 
Taking into account the comments made at the public design hearing, 
the state selects a final design proposal for submission to the FHW A 
division office. Accompanying this proposal is a formal request for 
design approval, a certification of hearings, a transcript of that pro-
ceeding and a thorough design study report including an updated 
noise analysis.121 At this time FHW A regulations require tl1at the 
chosen design configuration or a narrative description be published in 
a newspaper to assure its fullest public exposure.122 A state will often 
include written project assurances on relocation assistance and its final 
relocation plan with its request for design approval so that right-of-way 
acquisition may begin promptly.123 
Upon obtaining design approval, the state must prepare a right· 
of-way acquisition plan for review by the division engineer. Once this 
is granted, real property may be taken for the project with relocation 
assistance made available to the relocatees. If any utility facilities or 
railroad property lies in the path of the selected highway right-of-way, 
provision must be made for their relocation and clearance of the future 
roadbed. The state highway department must reach a relocation agree-
ment with the obstructing utility and submit a written copy to the 
FHW A division engineer for authorization to proceed.124 Federal 
funds may be used to partially reimburse states for the cost of utility 
relocation.125 Wi$ this federal approval, actual railroad and utility 
relocation may commence. 
As the time of actual highway construction approaches, the state 
120. No longer is highway design considered merely a technical question removed 
from public interest and scrutiny. F.C. Turner testified to the nature of popular con· 
cern over design decisions. He stated: 
[T]hey have a large number of points of interest in connection with the 
design. Basically, is it going to be elevated or depressed? If it is elevated, 
is it going to be on fill or is it going to be on structure? Am I going to be 
able to get across it to my neighbors on the other side here? How far do 
I have to go to get around? How far will the children have to go to get across 
to play with their friends on the other side? Will there be a pedestrian cross-
ing, and thousands of other questions that relate to the design? 
Red Tape 85-86. 
121. 23 C.F.R. § 772.7(b)(4) (1973). 
122. Id. § 790.10. 
123. FHWA Instructional Memorandum 80-1-71, paras. 15(a)-(b) (Oct. 11, 1972). 
124. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 304, paras. 7(c), 7(o)(l) (Dec. 
10, 1970). The agreement must be supported by "plans, specifications where required, 
and estimates of the work agreed upon, which shall be sufficiently informative and com-
plete to provide the State and division engineer with a clear showing of work required 
in accordance with paragraphs 7(h) and (i) of this memorandum." Id. para. 7(b). 
125. Id. para. 3. 
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must secure a minimum wage rate determination for the United States 
Department of Labor?26 This requirement was imposed by the Davis-
Bacon Act127 to insure that workers on federally assisted highway build-
ing projects received wages comparable to those earned in similar con-
struction in the immediate locality. Once minimum wage levels are 
determined, they "shall be set out in each project advertisement for 
bids and in each bid proposal form and shall be made a part of the 
contract covering the project.m28 The establishment of the prevailing 
wage rate is often computed on an area-wide basis in advance of any 
particular highway project. 
D. Plans, Specification and Estimate Approval 
Next, the state highway department must prepare detailed con-
struction plans, job specifications, and cost estimates (PS&E) relating 
to the federal-aid project.129 Approval of the PS&E officially commits 
the federal funding.130 This state presentation allows specific evalua-
tion by the division engineer of the details underlying the project. Once 
more, the granting of federal approval is conditioned upon compliance 
with several statutory, regulatory, and memoranda requirements. First, 
it must be shown that local road officials were consulted by the state 
highway department for the coopeJ;ative preparation of the PS&E.131 
Secondly, items included in the project estimates for construction en-
gineering may not exceed ten percent of the total cost.132 Thirdly, the 
PS&E must provide a facility: 
(1) that will adequately meet the existing and probable future 
traffic needs and conditions in a manner conducive to safety, dur-
ability, and economy of maintenance; {2) that will be designed and 
constructed in accordance with standards best suited to accomplish 
126. 23 U.S.C. § 113 (1970). A 1968 amendment extended this co:>verage to all 
federal-aid highways and not solely to the Interstate System. 
127. 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1970). 23 C.P.R. § 1.24 (1973) also deals with the 
subject of labor employed on highway projects. Section 1.24(a) forbids the use of con-
vict labor on any project. 
128. 23 u.s.c. § 113(b) (1970). 
129. Id. § 106(a). 
130. Id. Peterson and Kennan assert that PS&E approval is often a multi-staged, 
informal procedure hardly resembling the statutocy framework. Peterson & Kennan, su-
pra note 24. Administratively created "authorization to proceed with work" serves to 
delay the point of federal contractual obligation and is found in 23 C.P.R. § 1.12 
(1973). 
131. 23 u.s.c. § 106(b). 
132. Id. § 106(c). This appears to be an attempt to keep down preliminacy non-
construction costs. Section 106(d) also allows the PHWA to require, at its discretion, 
that the PS&E "be accompanied by a value engineering or other cost reduction analysis." 
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the foregoing objectives and to conform to the particular needs of 
each locality.133 
In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe134 the court held 
that the Secretary's approval must be based on sufficient evidence and 
adequate research and, furthermore, that this determination should also 
include an investigation of possible air pollution hazards.135 Fourthly, 
the geometric and construction standards used by the state in designing 
projects on the interstate system must be determined adequate for 
carrying the expected traffic load over a twenty-year period.136 Fin-
ally, the state must certify that it has complied with all hearing require-
ments.137 When the state highway department applies for PS&E ap-
proval, it also must request an authorization to proceed on projects en-
tailing actual construction work.138 This latter obligation has been ad-
ministratively imposed and does not appear in any federal statute. At 
this point solicitation of bids is imminent. 
Before the advertisement for construction bids can occur, the fed-
eral requirements for relocating displaced persons and firms must be 
fulfilled. The division engineer has an obligaJtion ;to verify the fact 
that "adequate replacement housing is in place and has been made 
available to relocatees ... "139 prior to his authorization for reimburs-
able construction. This verification shall be accomplished by "spot 
check field reviews by the division engineer to the depth necessary to 
provide sufficient evidence that there has been full compliance with 
the order."140 The spot check mechanism is the culmination of the 
federal effort to assist those who unfortunately are dislocated by feder-
ally sponsored programs. 
E. Construction Approval 
When the PS&E approval, authorization to proceed, and verifica-
tion of relocation are received, the state may advertise for and receive 
133. Id. § 109(a). Section 106(a) specifically denominates the standards estab· 
Iished in section 109 as a guide for the approval of PS&E's. 
134. 459 F.2d 1231, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
135. Id. at 1242. 
136. 23 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1970). Section 109 indicates that PS&E approval is to 
be predicated upon additional requirements. Subsection (g) calls for the promulgation 
of soil erosion standards while subsections (i) and (j) mandate noise level and air qual· 
ity consideration. 
137. Id. §§ 128(a)-(b). 
138. 23 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1973). 
139. FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-1-71, para. 16(a)(l) (Oct. 11, 
1972). This memorandum defines adequate and available replacement housing. Id. 
paras. 16(b)-(c). 
140. Id. para. 16(d). 
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competitive bids. It will recommend award of the construction con-
tract or rejection of bids to the division engineer who must then concur 
in the judgment. Ordinarily bids are approved without significant 
scrutiny. When the contract is approved by the federal agent, it will 
be returned to the state for administration. Thereafter, construction 
will take place under the periodic supervision of the division engineer. 
F. Other Statutory Prerequisites 
Several other statutes bear upon federal-aid highway construction. 
Although they are not formal prerequisites for the approval of any par-
ticular stage, they must be satisfied to comply with federal law. In 
this sense they might be of interest to groups challenging a federal-aid 
highway. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899141 requires that a permit 
to be obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers for all dredge and 
fill operations in navigable waters. Where a request is made for a per-
mit for the construction of a dike or causeway, the Corps must secure 
the consent of Congress and the approval of the Secretary of Transpor-
tation before issuing the permit. When a permit was issued for a dike 
and causeway for ilie Hudson River Expressway, the Second Circuit in 
Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe142 held that the 
Corps had breached a non-discretionary duty by failing to secure the 
consent and approval before acting.143 
The same federal statute144 requires a permit to construct a bridge 
over navigable waters. This permit must be obtained from the Coast 
Guard Commandant. According to the court in Monroe County Con-
servation Council, Inc. v. Volpe,145 no approval for federal funding 
can be granted until the bridge permit is acquired. 
The Historic Preservation Act146 requires that elaborate safeguards 
be undertaken to protect important historical areas and structures from 
unnecessary destruction or degradation. It has been held that these 
requirements must be complied with by highway construction officials 
to the fullest extent where the highway will impinge upon the protected 
subjeots.147 It is expected that this new statute will serve as a basis for 
much highway litigation in the future. 
141. 33 u.s.c. §§ 401-26 (1970). 
142. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970). 
143. Id. at 100. 
144. 33 u.s.c. § 401 (1970). 
145. 472 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Ci.r. 1972). 
146. 16 u.s.c. § 470 (1970). 
147. D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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Standing should no longer present a barrier to environmental liti-
gation in general and highway litigation in particular. The Supreme 
Court has defined and clarified the criteria for standing in most en-
vironmental suits in two recent decisions, Sierra Club v. Morton148 and 
United States v. SCRAP.149 
In Sierra Club/50 the Court reaffirmed earlier decisions which 
held that the alleged injury or potential injury necessary to obtain 
standing "may. reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as 
well as economic values."151 The Court added the requirement that 
such injury must directly affect the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs must al-
lege that the injury is "individualized" to them and that they are ad-
versely affected by such injury.152 It is insufficient that plaintiffs have 
"a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest 
and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the prob-
lem . . . . "153 Plaintiffs must show they have a "direct stake in the 
outcome" of the litigation.154 
Nevertheless, the Court also stated that an organization, such 
as the Sierra Club, could sue on behalf of its injured members where 
the :harm met the Court's cri<teria.155 Furthermore, once standing is 
established by the above test, the plaintiff organization "may assert the 
interests of the general public in suppo.ut: of [its] claims for equitable 
relief.m56 The fact that the injury in question is widely shared does 
not defeat standing as long as plaintiffs themselves are in fact injured. 
The Court in Sierra Club indicated that standing was to be denied 
the club for its failure to allege in its complaint that its members ac-
tually used the Mineral King Recreation Area and that they "would 
148. 405 u.s. 727 (1972). 
149. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 556 (1972). 
150. This case concerned the Sierra Club's attack on proposed plans to allow Walt 
Disney EnterPrises to build a large ski resort in the Mineral King Recreation Area in 
California. Incidentally, this project would involve a long road through the Sequoia Na-
tional Forest, though it is questionable whether such road would qualify as a federal-
aid highway. 
151. 405 U.S. at 738, citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, 
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). 
152. 405 U.S. at 736. 
153. ld. at 739. 
154. ld. at 740. 
155. ld. at 739. 
156. ld. at 740 & n.lS. 
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be affected in any of their activities or pasttimes by the Disney develop-
ment."157 Such allegations would have been sufficient to satisfy the 
Court's test.108 
The Court further clarified its standing test in United States v. 
SCRAP.159 Plaintiffs had attacked the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's decision to grant temporarily an overall freight rate increase to 
all of the nation's railroads. Plaintiffs alleged that the rate 4fre 
would cause increased use of non-recyclable goods; thus causing ac-
celerated consumption of natural resources, some :taken from the Wash-
ington, D.C. area where plaintiffs resided. This in tum would cause 
increased amounts of refuse to be disposed of in the Washington area 
parks used by the plaintiffs. The Court held that plaintiffs had by 
these allegations satisfied the standing requirements.160 Unlike the 
Sierra Club, plaintiffs claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal ac-
tion of the Commission would directly harm them in their "use and en-
joyment of the natural resources of the Washington area."161 
While suggesting that the nature of the alleged wrong was such 
that virtually every citizen of the nation might have standing to sue, 
the Court re-emphasized that "standing is not to be denied simply be-
cause many people suffer the same injury."162 As long as plaintiffs can 
demonstrate the requisite injury, standing will be found by the courts. 
The SCRAP decision's most important contribution to standing 
questions in environmental litigation is its holding that the fact that 
the alleged wrong and the alleged injury are connected by a "more at-
tenuated line of causation" than in cases such as Sierra Club is immater-
ial as long as the connection exists and harm is in fact caused to the 
plaintiffs.163 Furthermore, once the injury is alleged, the degree or 
quantity of the injury is also immaterial.164 
Both Sierra Club and SCRAP were suits brought to review federal 
administrative actions under section 702 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.l65 One can argue that the standing criteria established in 
157. Id. at 735. 
158. Id. at 736. The Court stated it would be willing to allow the Sierra Club to 
amend its complaint Id. at 736 n.8. See also West Virginia Highlands Conservancy 
v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971). 
159. 412 u.s. 669 (1973). 
160. Id. at 685, 689·90. 
161. Id. at 686. 
162. Id. at 687. 
163. Id. at 688-89. 
164. Id. at 689 n.14. 
165. 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1970). 
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these decisions are equally applicable to all environmental suits.100 In 
any event, these holdings are certainly available to establish the stand-
ing of highway litigants and to enable the review of the federal-aid 
highway decision process as effected by the Department of Transpor-
tation and the Federal Highway Authority. All facets of federal-aid 
highway construction must relate back to one or more federal adminis-
trative decisions. 
Highway litigation plaintiffs should be chosen to include residents 
of the area through which a planned highway is to pass. It is not neces-
sary that these plaintiffs be actually displaced by the highway. Resi-
dents of communities that will be affected by the highway should be 
sufficient. Civic groups representing members of these communities also 
will have standing. Individuals and groups whose members use park-
lands to be affected by a highway will, of course, have standing. The 
injuries to be alleged can include economic, aesthetic, social, and rec-
reational injuries. To be completely safe from even the most conserva-
tive of judges, a landowner who is apt to lose part of his land to the 
highway should be joined as a party plaintiff. Adequate fore-thought 
should, in light of the two above-cited cases, avoid all standing diffi-
culties.107 
IV. PLAINTIFF STRATEGIES FOR HIGHWAY LITIGATION 
The decisions in federal-aid highway cases to date have been gen-
erally in favor of the plaintiffs. While several of these decisions have 
established important points of law, many of the anti-highway victories 
166. See generally Comment, Supreme Court Decides the Mineral King Case: 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 2 ENV. L. REP. 10034 (1972); Comment, More on Standing: 
The Supreme Court's Last Word, The Tenth Circuit's Last Stand, 3 ENV. L. REP. 10096 
(1973). However, it must be remembered that, as a matter independent of the standing 
question, jurisdictional amount requirements must be satisfied when applicable. See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1970). Jurisdictional amount was not a matter of controversy in 
either Sierra Club or the SCRAP cases since both were brought under a special jurisdic-
tional statute which does not require a jurisdictional amount. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 
(1970). For a recent analysis of the jurisdictional amount requirements in a water pol-
lution damage suit see Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). It should 
be kept in mind, however, that special jurisdictional statutes will be available for most 
federal-aid highway litigation. 
167. Environmental plaintiffs should also remain aware of laches problems; see Ar-
lington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1329 (4th Cir. 1972); Lathan 
v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 1971); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 
1341 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831, 841 (D. Mass. 1971). Prob-
lems of sovereign immunity as to state party defendants also arise; see Citizens Comm. 
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Elliot v. Volpe, supra 
at 834. 
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have proved illusory. More often than not, the preliminary injunctions 
granted against state and federal agencies were later dissolved when the 
administrative officials substantially complied with the procedural re-
quirements of the relevant statutes and regulations.168 It has been dif-
ficult, in even the most recent cases, to achieve any sort of substantive 
review. While the courts have agreed with plaintiffs that the require-
ments of the various federal statutes and regulations must be met in 
precise detail, most of the highways in the cases discussed have been or 
will be completed in the future. Litigation may have slightly altered 
their location or added certain engineering or environmental safeguards 
to their design, but the highways will nonetheless be completed.169 
However, anti-highway litigants may be successful in future cases. 
This will be the result of two factors. First, current decisions indicate 
that broader procedural and substantive review may soon become pos-
sible. Secondly, litigants in future cases will be able to attack highway 
construction much earlier in the federal-aid process-before substan-
tial investment of resources forecloses meaningful review. 
As to the first development, the most successful judicial attacks at 
the present have been those directed against the taking of parklands 
under section 4(£) of the Department of Transportation Act.17° Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,171 the only United States 
Supreme Court decision in the highway area, strictly construed the 
statute to impose an ascertainable and enforceable duty on the Secre-
tary of Transportation to regulate the taking of parklands under pre-
scribed standards.172 The requirements of 4(f) are substantive as well 
as procedural and the actions of the Secretary can be reviewed against 
a clear congressional mandate. This is the rare exception in past high-
way litigation since the plaintiffs were able to avail themselves of a 
statute, which combines strict procedural mandates with :meaningful 
substantive requirements. However, most proposed highways do not 
cross extensive parklands. 
Otherwise, plaintiffs have had to concentrate on demanding ab-
solute compliance with the terms of the several federal statutes regul,at-
ing highway construction. This has been, at least, an important de-
laying and harassing tactic and will continue to remain so. The NEP A 
168. Red Tape 64-65. 
169. Id. 
170. 49 u.s.c. § 1653(f) (1970). 
171. 401 u.s. 402 (1971). 
172. I d. at 411-16. 
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EIS173 and the section 128174 public hearings demand extensive re-
search and thorough drafting and preparation on the part of federal 
and state officials. The fact that these officials are forced by litigation 
to consider the immensity of the task before them may cause them to 
carefully weigh public opinion before authorizing federal-aid highways. 
The Rivers and Harbors Act, 175 with its requirement of congressional 
consent, and the Relocation Statute, :requiring major state efforts, also 
act as highway deterrents in a similar manner. 
Nevertheless,. until recently most courts had considered their job 
finished when the procedural requirements were met. The vast quanti· 
ties of environmental, social, and economic data provided by impact 
statements and public hearings were found necessary for informed de-
cision-making by highway officials but were not weighed by the court 
in an ultimate determination of the merits of the project. 
There is, however, some recent authority to the effect that section 
101 of NEPA provides substantive rights and that courts may evaluate 
administrative decisions based on a project EIS to determine if the bene-
fits of a particular project may reasonably be said to outweigh its 
costs.176 If not, the project could be permanently enjoined. Although 
these decisions do not involve highway projects, their reasoning may 
be applied to this area, especially as the secondary effects of highway 
construction become understood. It is uncertain whether NEP A will 
eventually secure substantive rights to highway plaintiffs. However, 
it is becoming increasingly clear that NEP A will demand a broader 
procedural perspective from highway officals. As previously noted, 
the Conservation Society171 decision required an EIS for an entire high-
way corridor rather than for a small segment as had previously been 
the practice. The court suggested that the entire federal-aid highway 
scheme might be imcompatible with the NEPA mandate since the 
monies in the highway trust funds can be expended only for high-
ways.178 This clashes directly with the NEP A requirement that all al-
ternatives :to the construction of :the highway, :including mass transpor-
tation and the nonconstruction of the highway, be evaluated. 
173. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). 
174. 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970). 
175. 33 u.s.c. §§ 401-26 (1970). 
176. See Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); En· 
vironmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297-301 (8th Cir. 1972); 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
177. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973). 
178. ld. at 637. 
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Consideration of a highway as a whole, as discussed previously, 179 
gives highway officials a more meaningful opportunity to evaluate the 
impact of and need for a given highway. Similar anti-piecemealing 
requirements have been imposed on determinations under section 4(f), 
and may be applied to the public hearing requirements.180 Plaintiffs 
should stress these broadened procedural requirements in their cases. 
Beyond causing delay and increased effort on the part of defendants, 
this strategy may produce vast amounts of data which can be used in 
support of substantive arguments.181 
The success of future highway litigation will depend, secondly, on 
how early in the highway development process plaintiffs begin their 
attack. Many of the highways scrutinized in past cases had undergone 
extensive planning and occasionally some construction before a lawsuit 
was brought. This was often unavoidable since the planning and ap-
propriations for :these highways were concluded prior to the passage 
of several statutes upon which plaintiff had relied. While on-going 
project questions were often resolved in plaintiffs' favor, 182 plaintiffs 
nevertheless had lacked the statutory tools to bring appropdate litiga-
tion at an early time. As stressed in the previous discussion. of NEP A 
requirements, once substantial resources have been invested in any 
highway project, courts are hesitant to take any action which might ul-
timately render these expenditures wasted or useless. Indeed, there 
has been a widespread fear among environmental litigants that strict 
judicial enforcement of NEP A against on-going projects might produce 
a congressional backlash that would support amendments substantially 
weakening NEP A's requirements or curtailing judicial review. 
Future highway litigants should, however, be able to avoid this 
pitfall. By bringing suit as soon as possible after location approval is 
granted, plaintiffs will be in a position to demand of any new highway 
project (1) extensive research into the environmental, social, and eco-
nomic impact of the proposed highway, (2) compliance with all ap-
plicable federal statutes .and regulations, (3) .the broad investigation 
179. See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra. 
180. See Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas 
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1022 (5th Cir. 1971). 
181. A delay caused by enforced procedural compliance could disturb the projected 
expenditure of available federal funds, thus making possible lawsuits a potent threat. 
182. The questions of the application of new legislation to on-going highway proF 
ects begun before the effective dates of the new statutes are discussed in the following 
cases: Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); 
Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania 
Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971); Elliot v. Volpe, 328 
F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass. 1971). 
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of an entire highway corridor in respect to the required NEP A evalu-
ations, ( 4) a discussion of feasible alternatives to the highway, and (S) 
a cost-benefit analysis of the project which may lead to meaningful sub-
stantive review of the project. Plaintiffs' chances of success will be 
greatly enhanced when the litigation focuses on the entire proposed 
route of the highway and when plaintiffs argue their case under all 
applicable statutes rather than under a single cause of action. When 
the entire length of a proposed highway is judicially examined, it is 
likely that virtually every federal-aid highway regulation will apply at 
some point along the highway route. If concerned citizens are aware 
of the administrative procedure upon which the federal-aid highway 
progr:am is based, :they can demand compliance from their state and 
federal highway officials. Energetic public participation can inject en-
vironmental, social, and economic input into the highway construction 
system. This involvement must be continuous and must occur early 
enough in the process so that irreversible steps will not have been taken. 
As a practical matter, litigation should only be considered in extreme 
situations.183 But if a serious conflict does arise, legal weapons do 
exist to meet the situation. These weapons can be used to make the 
highway construction system respond to interests other than those of the 
highway builders. 
RoNALD H. RosENBERG 
ALLEN H. OLSON 
183. One factor tempering frequent resort to litigation has been the high cost of 
waging the legal battle. In his testimony, John W. Vardaman, an environmental lawyer, 
describes the tremendous financial strain imposed upon anti-highway groups in the 
course of litigation. Hearings on S. 3589 & 3590 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of 
the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-H37, at 600-03 (1972). 
